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  II.-34 
LET’S TALK ABOUT SEX: A DISCUSSION OF 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER TITLE VII 
Abstract: On July 18, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Bos-
tock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, that Title VII does not protect 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the workplace. To the 
Eleventh Circuit, sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from sex discrimi-
nation, which the statute explicitly prohibits. Many courts continue to follow this 
traditional rule and agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. The Second and 
Seventh Circuits, however, have instead followed the guidance of the Equal Op-
portunity Employment Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that enforces Ti-
tle VII, and held the opposite. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the 
question of whether Title VII’s ban on discrimination “because of . . . sex” also 
protects against sexual orientation discrimination in particular, but that may not 
be the case for long. This Comment argues, ahead of the Supreme Court’s antici-
pated decision in the Bostock appeal, that the Supreme Court should follow the 
guidance of the EEOC and definitively hold that sexual orientation discrimina-
tion in the workplace is prohibited by Title VII. By doing so, the Supreme Court 
will remain faithful to the purpose of Title VII—equality in the workplace—and 
will follow its own precedent that has laid the groundwork for a more expansive 
reading of “because of . . . sex.” 
INTRODUCTION 
If somebody told you that, in 2020, it is legal to fire an employee because 
that person is gay, would you believe it?1 Or would you think that in a country 
where it is now legal to marry whomever you wish, this type of employment 
discrimination has been eliminated?2 Although many may be surprised to learn 
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not prohibit all forms of sexual ori-
                                                                                                                      
 1 See Jack B. Harrison, Because of Sex, 51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 91, 98–99 (2018) (providing an 
overview of the inconsistencies across jurisdictions regarding protections against sexual orientation 
discrimination in the workplace). “Sexual orientation” refers to a person’s sexual or romantic prefer-
ences for others. Glossary of Terms, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/
glossary-of-terms [https://perma.cc/DFL4-LJEC]. Currently, it is legal to fire someone on the basis of 
sexual orientation in the majority of states. Harrison, supra, at 98–99. 
 2 Harrison, supra note 1, at 95–96. There has been significant progress towards inclusion and 
equality for the LGBTQ community, especially following the legalization of same-sex marriage, but 
there are still significant shortcomings under current law, including the fact that no federal employ-
ment protection exists. Id. 
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entation discrimination in the workplace, this is an issue that courts across the 
country continue to address.3 
Much of the present-day discussion centers around the meaning of “sex” 
under Title VII, a federal statute aimed at eliminating workplace discrimina-
tion.4 Some courts find that Congress intended for Title VII’s prohibition 
against discriminating “because of . . . sex” to forbid only gender-based dis-
crimination, whereas others interpret the meaning of sex more broadly and be-
lieve it extends to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well. 5 
Despite the existing inconsistencies regarding what constitutes sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII, a definitive answer may be on the horizon.6 On July 1, 
                                                                                                                      
 3 See Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964, 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation in accordance with the Elev-
enth Circuit’s precedent), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 
853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a cognizable 
claim under Title VII); see also Harrison, supra note 1, at 121 (articulating the increasing willingness of 
courts to address questions regarding the reach of Title VII and the inconsistencies across jurisdictions). A 
cognizable claim is one that can be heard and decided by a court after establishing standing. Cognizable, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The current “patchwork of laws and policies” often does not 
reflect the belief of many Americans who assume that Title VII does already prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. Harrison, supra note 1, at 99–100.  
 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employ-
er . . . to fail to refuse or to hire any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
. . . .”); see Harrison, supra note 1, at 103 (noting that the definitions for “sex” and “discrimination” 
are ambiguous because Title VII’s text does not clearly define either term); Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex 
Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 999 (2015) (noting the literature and movements 
that have worked over the past three decades to give meaning to anti-discrimination laws and equality, 
including the women’s rights, civil rights, and gay rights movements). “Sex” refers to a person’s ana-
tomical composition assigned at birth whereas “gender” relates to one’s understanding of self as male, 
female, both, or neither. See Glossary of Terms, supra note 1. One’s gender and biological sex do not 
always align and sexual orientation can depend on how one identifies and expresses sexual prefer-
ences, regardless of biological sex. See id. 
 5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Compare Hively, 853 F.3d at 340 (holding that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII), with Blum v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit an employer from 
making employment decisions based on a person’s sexual orientation). 
 6 See Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964 (affirming dismissal of a sexual orientation discrimination 
claim because it is not a cognizable Title VII claim in the Eleventh Circuit); Monthly Argument Cal-
endar October 2019, Supreme Court of the U. S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalOctober2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNW5-HN8A] (indicat-
ing that the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Bostock on October 8, 2019); see also Amy 
Howe, Court Releases October Calendar, SCOTUSBLOG (July 1, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.
scotusblog.com/2019/07/court-releases-october-calendar-2 [https://perma.cc/ABK7-8Q7A] (stating 
that the Supreme Court was asked to determine the scope of Title VII as it related to sexual orientation 
discrimination in the cases Bostock and Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 
2018)). The Eleventh Circuit will not overturn precedent without a contrary decision from the Su-
preme Court or an en banc decision, where all judges participate. See Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964–
65 (remaining consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s precedent that sexual orientation discrimination 
is not prohibited by Title VII); En Banc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (referring to 
when all the judges of a court participate). 
II.-36 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
2019, the Supreme Court released its October oral argument calendar and in-
cluded Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, an Eleventh Cir-
cuit appeal, as one of the cases.7 The central question in Bostock is whether 
Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of . . . sex” includes 
sexual orientation discrimination.8 On May 10, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Bostock affirmed that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is not prohibited by Title VII, but will the Supreme Court use this 
as an opportunity to decide otherwise?9 
Ahead of the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in Bostock, this Com-
ment argues that, based on the Supreme Court’s precedent and the judicial 
trend towards expanding the traditional understanding of “because of . . . sex,” 
the Supreme Court should use this as an opportunity to explicitly prohibit sex-
ual orientation discrimination under Title VII.10 Part I provides background 
information about Title VII, including its legislative intent and history, and in-
troduces the Bostock case.11 Part II provides a closer look at the Supreme 
Court’s prior decisions addressing the scope of Title VII and examines how 
various circuit courts and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) have used those cases to inform their interpretations of “because 
of . . . sex” in the context of workplace discrimination.12 Part III then discusses 
the concept of “associational discrimination” in the context of sex discrimina-
tion, an idea previously reserved for racial discrimination but advanced by the 
                                                                                                                      
 7 Monthly Argument Calendar October 2019, supra note 6. The Court consolidated oral argu-
ments for Bostock with Zarda, where the Second Circuit held that sexual orientation discrimination is 
a cognizable claim under Title VII. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108; Howe, supra note 6. In Zarda, a skydiv-
ing instructor was fired after a client claimed she had been inappropriately touched by Zarda after he 
disclosed he was gay. 883 F.3d at 108–09. Zarda denied this allegation and filed a Title VII claim for 
being discriminated against on the basis of his sexual orientation and gender. Id. at 109. By deciding 
on these two cases, the Supreme Court will be answering the question of whether Title VII protects 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Howe, supra note 6. 
 8 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618 (U.S. May 25, 2018). 
 9 See Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964–65 (emphasizing the Eleventh Circuit’s prevailing rule that 
sexual orientation discrimination is not a cognizable claim under Title VII). The Eleventh Circuit 
proceeded to vote against a rehearing en banc. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 894 F.3d 
1335, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at i (stating the question 
for the Supreme Court to answer). 
 10 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (establishing that same-sex 
sexual harassment is a cognizable claim under Title VII, a further expansion of the definition of “be-
cause of . . . sex”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (holding that claims 
where the plaintiff shows that discrimination is on the basis of sex stereotyping—where an employer 
acts on the basis that an employee must adhere to traditional gender norms and behaviors—are cog-
nizable under Title VII); Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52 (holding that sexual orientation discrimination is 
a cognizable claim under Title VII because sex discrimination encompasses discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation). 
 11 See infra notes 15–40 and accompanying text. 
 12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see infra notes 41–80 and accompanying text. 
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EEOC.13 This Comment ultimately argues that the Supreme Court should fol-
low the EEOC’s precedent and definitively hold that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 
I. HISTORY OF TITLE VII, SEX DISCRIMINATION, AND BOSTOCK 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 eliminates discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the workplace.15 The 
legislative history of Title VII, discussed in Section A, provides a helpful 
backdrop for understanding the circuit split illustrated by the Bostock case de-
scribed in Section B.16 
A. Legislative History of Title VII and Sexual Orientation  
Discrimination in the Workplace 
The scant legislative history of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimina-
tion leaves significant room for interpretation by the courts.17 At its core, Title 
VII makes it unlawful for an employer to make employment-related decisions 
because of a person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.18 Despite 
being defined in the statute, courts have continued to differ in interpreting the 
statute’s reference to discrimination “because of . . . sex.”19 
Oftentimes, the varying interpretations have been attributed to the limited 
legislative history surrounding the inclusion of “sex” among the statute’s pro-
tected classes.20 The legislative record only shows one afternoon of debate re-
                                                                                                                      
 13 See infra notes 81–97 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 81–97 and accompanying text. 
 15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
 16 See infra notes 17–40 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Harrison, supra note 1, at 103 (noting that the limited legislative history has contributed to 
debates about the meaning of sex discrimination among scholars and courts alike). 
 18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
fail to refuse or to hire any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileg-
es of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”); see 
also Marc Chase McAllister, Extending the Sex-Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age Discrimination 
Claims Involving Multiple Discriminatory Motives, 60 B.C. L. REV. 469, 470–71 (2019) (explaining 
that discrimination claims ordinarily stem from instances when an employer treats employees of one 
protected class differently from other employees). A protected class is one that receives explicit pro-
tection from a statute. Protected Class, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3. When an employer 
discriminates on the basis of a combination of protected traits, such as race and sex together, this is 
referred to as a “multiple-motive” claim. McAllister, supra, at 471.  
 19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (focusing on conditions relating to pregnancy and childbirth). Compare 
Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964–65 (affirming that claims of sexual orientation discrimination are not 
cognizable under Title VII in the Eleventh Circuit) with Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52 (holding that Title 
VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the Seventh Circuit).  
 20 See Harrison, supra note 1, at 103 (detailing the seemingly last-minute addition of “sex” to the 
statute and arguments that are put forward to infer intent from these circumstances, including ques-
tionable motives). 
II.-38 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
lating to the inclusion of “sex” in the Act.21 Furthermore, there has been specu-
lation that House Rules Committee Chairman Howard Smith added the term as 
a sabotage attempt, which only contributes to the ambiguity regarding legisla-
tive intent.22 Coupled with the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, the 
precise meaning and scope of discrimination on the basis of sex is still largely 
undefined.23 
The present Title VII-related debate focuses on the LGBTQ community24 
and whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is captured by Title 
VII.25 One in four LGBTQ employees reported discrimination because of their 
sexual orientation in the past five years, and one in three LGBTQ employees 
are not “out” at work.26 Without consistent laws banning discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, this type of workplace discrimination is likely to 
persist.27 
                                                                                                                      
 21 Id.  
 22 See id. at 104–05 (discussing scholarly views on Representative Smith’s motive in introducing 
his addition). Some believe Representative Smith made this change as a sabotage attempt to ensure 
Title VII did not become law. Id. at 105. Other scholars highlight the fact that Smith did want to pro-
tect women, specifically white women, especially when race was being protected. Id. But see Rachel 
Osterman, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex 
Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409, 410 (2009) (arguing that this popu-
lar narrative about Smith’s motives paints an incomplete picture of the Act’s history because it ignores 
the fact that many women’s groups, with support of female House members, lobbied fiercely to re-
ceive this protection). 
 23 See Jack B. Harrison, “To Sit or Stand”: Transgender Persons, Gendered Restrooms, and the 
Law, 40 HAW. L. REV. 49, 73 (2017) (discussing how lower courts have differed in applying the On-
cale and Price Waterhouse decisions to Title VII sex discrimination claims). The Supreme Court has 
provided some guidance on what “sex” means beyond the more straightforward case where gender 
plays a role in employment decisions. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (holding that Title VII protects 
against same-sex sexual harassment that is hostile and abusive); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–
51 (holding that claims where the plaintiff shows that discrimination is on the basis of sex stereotyp-
ing, such as punishing a woman for aggressiveness, are cognizable under Title VII).  
 24 Glossary of Terms, supra note 1. The acronym “LGBTQ” refers to people who identify as 
“lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer.” Id. 
 25 See Harrison, supra note 1, at 121 (noting that federal courts across the country have addressed 
the explicit question of whether Title VII extends to protecting against sexual orientation discrimina-
tion). 
 26 BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY, THE WILLIAMS INST., DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE OF EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & ITS EFFECTS ON LGBT PEOPLE 2, 4 (2011), https://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-Mallory-Discrimination-July-20111.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EYH9-CJ6S]. Examples of being discriminated against because of one’s sexual orientation include 
being harassed or fired. Id. 
 27 See Harrison, supra note 1, at 95, 99–100, 101 (discussing sexual orientation discrimination in 
the workplace). Inconsistencies exist across state and federal laws. Id. Thirty-two states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have taken some steps to limit and/or prohibit sexual orientation discrimination 
through legislation or executive action. Id. An employee is “out” at work when that person’s sexual 
orientation is shared publicly. See Glossary of Terms, supra note 1. Furthermore, approximately 455 
of 500 of Fortune 500 companies independently prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO COMING OUT 15, https://assets2.
hrc.org/files/assets/resources/resource_guide_april_2014.pdf [hereinafter A RESOURCE GUIDE TO 
2020] Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII II.-39 
B. The Bostock Case 
On May 10, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue of whether 
Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners.28 Plaintiff Gerald Lynn 
Bostock, a gay man, worked for Clayton County, Georgia as the Child Welfare 
Services Coordinator for over a decade from 2003 to 2013.29 In January 2013, 
Bostock joined a gay recreational softball league.30 In June 2013, he was fired 
from his position with the county.31 Although the county stated Bostock was 
fired because of “conduct unbecoming of a County employee,” Bostock al-
leged it was because he was gay.32 
A magistrate judge for the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia sided with Clayton County and recommended to the district 
judge that Bostock’s sexual orientation discrimination claim be dismissed.33 In 
                                                                                                                      
COMING OUT]. Still, twenty-nine states do not have laws in place that explicitly prohibit terminating 
an employee on the basis of sexual orientation. Harrison, supra note 1, at 95–96. Sexual orientation 
discrimination includes, but is not limited to, being fire, overlooked for job opportunities, or harassed 
because of one’s sexual orientation. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., A WORK DIVIDED: 
UNDERSTANDING THE CLIMATE FOR LGBTQ WORKERS WORLDWIDE 16–17, https://assets2.hrc.org/
files/assets/resources/AWorkplaceDivided-2018.pdf [hereinafter A WORK DIVIDED]. 
 28 Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964–65. 
 29 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192898, at 
*2–3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2016). Bostock worked for Clayton County from January 2003 to 2013 where 
he served as the Child Welfare Services Coordinator for the Juvenile Court and managed the Court 
Appointed Special Advocate program. Id. 
 30 Id. at *3. Bostock alleged that he was openly criticized for being gay by a supervisor after he 
joined the “Hotlanta Softball League.” Id. 
 31 Id. at *4. 
 32 Id. Bostock first filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) where he alleged sex discrimination and stated: “I believe that I have been dis-
criminated against because of my sex (male/sexual orientation).” Id. Bostock’s initial complaint and 
First Amended Complaint alleged only discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Pro Se Em-
ployment Discrimination Complaint Form at 1–2, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
192898 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2016) (No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ); First Amended Complaint at 6, 
Bostock, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192898 (No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ). Bostock’s Second 
Amended Complaint, however, alleged that the defendant initiated an internal audit on program funds 
managed by Bostock as a “pretext for discrimination based on his sexual orientation and failure to 
conform to a gender stereotype.” Second Amended Complaint at 5–6, Bostock, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEX-
IS 192898 (No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ). 
 33 Bostock, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192898, at *13. Under federal and Georgia law, a magistrate 
judge, when assigned to hear a pre-trial dispositive motion, must enter a recommended disposition 
which can be accepted, rejected, or modified by a district judge if a party objects, as was the case in 
Bostock. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) (governing dispositive motions assigned to magistrate judges in 
federal court); N.D. GA. LR 72.1(B) (providing the local Georgia rule regarding dispositive pre-trial 
motions assigned by the district judge). A dispositive motion is one in which a party asks the trial 
court to decide on a claim or case without further proceedings. Dispositive Motion, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 3. In addition to rejecting Bostock’s sexual orientation discrimination claim, 
the magistrate judge also determined that Bostock failed to state a gender stereotyping claim with the 
EEOC, and thus did not exhaust the administrative remedies. Bostock, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192898, 
II.-40 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
reaching this conclusion, the magistrate judge relied heavily on a 1979 prece-
dential decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Blum v. Gulf Oil Cor-
poration, which held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation dis-
crimination.34 The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommenda-
tion in full, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, reiterating the bind-
ing precedent of Blum.35 On July 18, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit voted against 
granting a rehearing en banc on behalf of Bostock, thus effectively upholding 
the Blum precedent.36 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bostock follows the prevailing rule re-
garding the inapplicability of Title VII to claims of sexual orientation discrimina-
tion.37 To support this view, courts continue to rely upon a number of ration-
ales.38 For example, some courts turn to the plain meaning of the statute, defin-
ing sex as one’s gender.39 Courts have also referenced the repeated failure to 
                                                                                                                      
at *20–21. The district judge affirmed the magistrate judge’s determination that Bostock failed to state a 
claim and failed to exhaust administrative remedies on July 21, 2017. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 1:16-
CV-1460-ODE, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217815, at *8 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 2017). 
 34 597 F.2d at 938; Bostock, 2016 LEXIS 192898, at *9. The plaintiff in Blum claimed that he 
was terminated because he was Jewish, male, white, and gay. 597 F.2d at 937. The trial court disa-
greed with Blum’s discrimination claims after holding that he was fired because of using the company 
phone for personal business, and the appeals court affirmed. Id. at 937–38. The Eleventh Circuit was 
established in 1981 after the old Fifth Circuit was divided into two. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 
F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981). Bonner established that the old Fifth Circuit’s precedent is binding 
on the Eleventh Circuit. Id. 
 35 Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964 (refusing to overrule the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
sexual orientation discrimination claim in accordance with the Blum precedent). 
 36 See Bostock, 894 F.3d 1335 (denying the request for a rehearing en banc after the plaintiff’s claim 
regarding sexual orientation discrimination was dismissed for failing to state a redressable claim, mean-
ing that no remedy was available); Redressable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3. 
 37 See Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of Sex 
Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2018) 
(providing an overview of the historical understanding of “because of . . . sex” as well as a list of 
cases that address the related issues across jurisdictions). The prevailing rule is that Title VII does not 
protect against sexual orientation discrimination. Id.; see Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964–65 (holding 
that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit). 
 38 See Surette, supra note 37 (providing a more comprehensive list of various arguments utilized 
by courts in support of the notion that sexual orientation discrimination is not protected by Title VII). 
For example, courts that derive the “plain meaning” from the language of the statute point to the fact 
that Congress has never modified the statute. Id. Lower courts say they are powerless to change prec-
edent. Id.  
 39 Id.; see also Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that sex under Title 
VII refers only to membership in a gender group); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 
F.3d 252, 258 (1st Cir. 1999) (implicating the “plain meaning” of sex by stating that matters relating 
to sexual activity are not within the scope of Title VII). Both cases involved harassment in the work-
place, such as name-calling stemming from plaintiffs’ sexual orientation. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35; 
Higgins, 194 F.3d at 257. 
2020] Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII II.-41 
pass federal legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in particu-
lar.40 
II. THE REACH OF TITLE VII 
Two of the strongest arguments for excluding sexual orientation discrimi-
nation under Title VII are precedent and congressional intent (or lack there-
of).41 Nevertheless, the meaning of “because of . . . sex” has evolved and 
broadened over time.42 In 1964, there was an initial push to remove the barrier 
between women and the workforce, but sex discrimination grew into a signifi-
cantly more expansive concept, as illustrated by the forthcoming cases.43 Sec-
tion A of this Part discusses how the Supreme Court has expanded the meaning 
of “sex” within Title VII, and Section B examines the larger impact the ex-
panded definition has had over time.44 
A. Early Supreme Court Groundwork 
The Supreme Court has been instrumental in expanding the understanding 
of “sex” under Title VII.45 An early, and noteworthy, example of the Court’s 
broadening its reach occurred in 1989 when the Supreme Court held in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins that sex discrimination was not limited to discrimina-
                                                                                                                      
 40 Surette, supra note 37; see also Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (stating that Congress rejected legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination on 
multiple occasions); Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35 (emphasizing congressional inaction which prevented 
sexual orientation discrimination from being explicitly prohibited by Title VII). 
 41 Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 
235–36 (2012). Because the congressional intent is unclear, courts have used the limited legislative 
history to support an understanding that “sex” under Title VII is synonymous with gender. See id. at 
239 (providing that Title VII’s inclusion of sex was to make women equal with men in the work-
place). 
 42 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018) (stating that “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” includes 
discrimination related to pregnancy and childbirth). The definition of sex has expanded in scope to 
universally prohibit discrimination related to sex stereotyping and same-sex sexual harassment. See 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (establishing that same-sex sexual 
harassment is a cognizable claim under Title VII, a further expansion of the definition of “because of 
. . . sex”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (holding that discrimination on 
the basis of sex stereotyping is prohibited by Title VII).  
 43 See Harrison, supra note 1, at 109, 112 (explaining how Price Waterhouse and Oncale set the 
stage for expanding the scope of “because of . . . sex” under Title VII by establishing that sex stereotyp-
ing and same-sex sexual harassment are both prohibited by Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination); 
Schultz, supra note 4, at 998–99 (noting the critical role the civil rights, women’s rights, and gay rights 
movements of the twentieth century have had on shaping what Title VII means today); Schwartz, supra 
note 41, at 242 (questioning reliance on legislative history because Congress could not have foreseen 
every way Title VII may be invoked). 
 44 See infra notes 45–80 and accompanying text. 
 45 See Harrison, supra note 1, at 114 (arguing that the Supreme Court has expanded the under-
standing of “because of . . . sex” through Price Waterhouse and Oncale in particular). 
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tion based on biological sex alone.46 The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was 
Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at Price Waterhouse who was recommended 
for partnership.47 When she did not make partner, Hopkins sued Price Water-
house, alleging the company discriminated against her on the basis of sex.48 
In 1985, the District Court for the District of Columbia, and ultimately the 
Supreme Court in 1989, emphasized the role that sex stereotyping played in 
Price Waterhouse’s decision not to promote Hopkins, and found for Hopkins 
under Title VII.49 The district court highlighted the advice Hopkins received to 
walk, talk, and dress in a more feminine manner to increase her chances of 
making partner.50 To both the lower courts and the Supreme Court, an employ-
er’s insistence that an employee match the stereotype associated with the em-
ployee’s gender was a violation of Title VII.51 In expressing this view, the Su-
                                                                                                                      
 46 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (holding that claims where the plaintiff proves discrim-
ination on the basis of sex stereotyping are cognizable under Title VII by showing that gender played 
a role in an employment decision). Sex stereotyping is defined by the Supreme Court as evaluating 
employees by their gender stereotype, either male or female. Id. at 251. Punishing a woman for being 
aggressive when the role requires that trait is an example of sex stereotyping. Id. Under Price Water-
house, if gender is proven to be a factor considered by an employer making an employment decision, 
Title VII is relevant. Id. at 250. Gender stereotyping claims arise when an individual is discriminated 
against because the individual does not embody the stereotype associated with being male or female. Id. 
at 251. It is distinct from sexual orientation discrimination, which arises when an individual is dis-
criminated against because of the individual’s sexual attractions. See A RESOURCE GUIDE TO COMING 
OUT, supra note 27, at 15 (providing examples of sexual orientation discrimination, including being 
harassed or fired because of one’s sexual preferences).  
 47 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–32. In 1982, Hopkins was not made a partner. Id. When the 
time came the following year to re-propose Hopkins for partner, the partners refused, prompting her to 
file a Title VII claim. Id. When an employee is being considered for partner, Price Waterhouse’s Ad-
missions Committee makes a recommendation to the Policy Board. Id. at 232. This recommendation 
is based on evaluations and comments from other partners. Id. In their comments, many partners 
praised Hopkins for her performance and accomplishments, but some pointed to Hopkins’s worrisome 
interpersonal skills, including her aggressiveness. Id. at 233–34. Ultimately, the district court deter-
mined that negative reactions to Hopkins’s personality could often be attributed to the fact she was a 
woman, not acting femininely enough for her employer’s standards. Id. at 237. This was further evi-
denced by Hopkins’s being called “macho” and advised to attend charm school. Id. at 235. 
 48 Id. at 232. 
 49 Id. at 236–37. The trial court found for Hopkins and determined that Price Waterhouse discrim-
inated against her on the basis of sex by relying upon comments stemming from sex stereotyping in 
making its employment decision. Id. Although the appeals court affirmed, it differed in its analysis by 
articulating that an employer will not be liable under Title VII “if it proves by clear and convincing 
evidence that it would have made the same employment decision” in the absence of discriminatory 
motives. Id. at 237 (emphasis added). 
 50 See id. at 235 (citing to the district court’s analysis of Price Waterhouse’s reliance on interper-
sonal skills, including those related to the view of proper female behavior); Hopkins v. Price Water-
house, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985), aff’d, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (noting that Price Water-
house’s head partner advised Hopkins to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry”). 
 51 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (stating that gender is an unlawful motive when making 
employment decisions, and by considering sex stereotypes, Price Waterhouse violated Title VII); 
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preme Court significantly advanced the argument that Title VII covers the en-
tire spectrum of disparate treatment between men and women, moving beyond 
the traditional understanding of sex, meaning gender.52 
The next major Supreme Court decision that further expanded the defini-
tion of sex under Title VII was in 1997, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc.53 Prior to Oncale, the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of 
same-sex sexual harassment.54 In Oncale, a male employee of Sundowner was 
repeatedly threatened and assaulted by his fellow male colleagues.55 The Su-
preme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s finding that Title VII did not apply to 
same-sex sexual harassment claims.56 Beyond establishing that same-sex sexu-
al harassment is redressable under Title VII, the Oncale decision also repre-
sented the Supreme Court’s willingness, and duty, to settle circuit splits.57 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court introduced an important parallel between race-
based discrimination and sex-based discrimination.58 Specifically, the Supreme 
Court in Oncale recognized that members of the same group may still act in a 
discriminatory way against one another.59 
                                                                                                                      
Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1120 (determining that because sex stereotyping went into Price 
Waterhouse’s decision-making, Title VII was violated as a sex-based consideration). 
 52 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250; see Surette, supra note 37 (articulating that traditional 
understandings of sex interpreted “sex” to mean “gender”). 
 53 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82 (holding same-sex sex discrimination impermissible under Title VII). 
 54 See Harrison, supra note 1, at 112 (noting the Supreme Court addressed the issue of same-sex 
sexual harassment following inconsistent court holdings). 
 55 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. The lower court in Oncale, in following the Fifth Circuit’s prece-
dential decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1994), held that 
harassment by a male supervisor against another male employee does not constitute a Title VII viola-
tion. In Garcia, the plaintiff-employee brought suit against his supervisor, whom he alleged sexually 
harassed him on multiple occasions, including by grabbing his crotch area. 28 F.3d at 448. A claim 
that is not redressable is one in which no remedy or relief may be granted by the court. Redressable, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 56 Oncale, 523 U.S at 77, 82. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that same-sex sexual harass-
ment is prohibited by Title VII, thus expanding the statute’s scope. Id. at 82. The Court recognized 
that discrimination on the basis of sex can occur between members of the same sex and also does not 
need to be motivated only by sexual desire. Id. at 81. 
 57 See id. at 79–80 (recognizing that the Supreme Court’s decision would impact circuit courts 
that established categorical rules placing same-sex sexual harassment outside the scope of Title VII). 
Although, as the Supreme Court noted, Congress likely did not have this type of harassment in mind 
when passing the statute, not including same-sex sexual harassment would go against principles of 
law and potentially expose individuals to an unsafe and offensive work environment. Id.  
 58 See id. at 78 (explaining that same-sex sex discrimination is unlawful just as race discrimina-
tion by members of the same race is also impermissible); see also infra notes 81–97 and accompany-
ing text (further illustrating the parallel between race and sex discrimination in the context of Title 
VII). 
 59 523 U.S at 78. 
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B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Claims Under Title VII  
Post-Price Waterhouse and Oncale 
The Price Waterhouse and Oncale decisions undoubtedly paved the way 
for a broader reading of Title VII sex discrimination.60 Nevertheless, the mech-
anisms available to LGBTQ individuals under Title VII remain limited and 
vary greatly across jurisdictions.61 
A majority of courts, such as the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, still follow 
the view that sexual orientation discrimination is not prohibited by Title VII.62 
To these courts, the Price Waterhouse and Oncale decisions only apply to a 
specific set of circumstances, and sexual orientation discrimination remains 
outside the scope of Title VII, as determined by precedent.63 
The strong reliance on judicial precedence is the route the Eleventh Cir-
cuit took in Bostock.64 Although the district court provided additional details 
                                                                                                                      
 60 Id. at 82; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250; see Harrison, supra note 1, at 114–16 (pointing 
out the understanding of “because of . . . sex” was broadened as a result of Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale but also introduces the limitations). For example, plaintiffs who have attempted to bring sexu-
al orientation discrimination claims under Title VII by arguing that the discrimination stemmed from 
sex stereotyping have often been unsuccessful. Harrison, supra note 1, at 114–16. Because sexual 
orientation discrimination claims have not been upheld, utilizing the logic of the Supreme Court is 
still unsuccessful in most jurisdictions. Id. 
 61 See Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 330, 339 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that sexual 
orientation discrimination is not a cognizable claim even post-Price Waterhouse and Oncale in fol-
lowing the Fifth Circuit’s precedent); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 342, 351 
(7th Cir. 2017) (relying at least in part on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale to rule that, in the Seventh Circuit, sexual orientation is a cognizable claim under Title VII 
because of the “common-sense reality” that cannot separate sexual orientation discrimination from sex 
discrimination). An example of a limited mechanism available to LGBTQ individuals is bringing a 
discrimination claim based on sex stereotyping, rather than sexual orientation. Surette, supra note 37. 
 62 Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 330–31; Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964, 
964–65 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019). Wittmer involved a case where a 
transgender woman’s employment offer was rescinded after a background check discrepancy came to 
light. 915 F.3d at 331. After learning that her offer was no longer valid, Wittmer sent an email accus-
ing Phillips 66 employees of discriminating against her because she was transgender. Id. The Phillips 
66 employees denied having any knowledge of Wittmer’s sexual identity and further asserted her 
being transgender would have no bearing on the company’s decision to rescind the employment offer. 
Id. Wittmer ultimately filed a Title VII claim, which was dismissed when the court granted summary 
judgment on behalf of the defendants. Id. In reaching its conclusion regarding claims of sexual orien-
tation discrimination under Title VII, the majority in Wittmer relied on precedent, without providing 
additional support for the holding in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp, 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979). Wittmer, 
915 F.3d at 330. 
 63 See Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 330 (stating the court already addressed the issue and Blum remains 
binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit); Blum, 597 F.2d at 938 (holding that Title VII does not prohibit 
an employer from discriminating on the basis of one’s sexual orientation); Surette, supra note 37 
(indicating a distinction between sex stereotyping and sexual orientation claims).  
 64 See Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964–65 (citing Blum, which foreclosed the notion that sexual 
orientation discrimination was a cognizable claim in the Eleventh Circuit, as binding precedent); see 
also Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017) (stating that Price Waterhouse 
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about the history of Title VII and acknowledged the circuit split, the district 
court’s ultimate finding was that Blum was binding and not to be reconsid-
ered.65 The appeals court affirmed the decision of the lower court and voted 
against granting a rehearing en banc.66 
The Bostock decision runs contrary67 to the stance taken by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency tasked 
with enforcing Title VII.68 The EEOC has instead asserted a more expansive 
view of sex discrimination, relying heavily on the groundwork laid by the 
Price Waterhouse and Oncale decisions.69 In 2015, the EEOC issued its land-
                                                                                                                      
and Oncale do not change the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Blum as precedent because the Supreme 
Court did not directly address the issue of sexual orientation discrimination in those cases).  
 65 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192898, at 
*7–10 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2016). The magistrate judge did provide some details on the legislative in-
tent and history of Title VII, including the intention to even the playing field for women and men in 
the workplace. Id. at *7. The magistrate judge also cited to cases in various circuits that agree with 
Blum, including Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999). Bostock, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192898, at *6–7, *9. Ultimately, the district court declined to decide the issue 
and invited Congress to amend the statute if it wished to do so. Bostock, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
192898, at *13. Furthermore, the district judge, in reviewing the magistrate judge’s order, provided 
minimal details regarding the reasoning behind the Blum precedent and concluded that the Eleventh 
Circuit rejects the possibility of bringing a Title VII claim regarding sexual orientation discrimination. 
See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217815 (N.D. 
Ga. July 21, 2017), at *6–7 (reaffirming the court’s reliance on precedent). 
 66 See Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 894 F.3d 1335, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming 
the district court’s decision to dismiss the case); Bostock, 723 Fed. App’x at 964–65 (voting against 
granting a rehearing en banc). 
 67 See Bostock, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 192898, at *12–13 (recognizing the EEOC’s stance but refusing 
to follow the agency’s earlier decision without an amendment from Congress). 
 68 See Baldwin v. Fox, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080, at 6 (Jul. 15, 2015) https://www.eeoc.
gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf (holding that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title 
VII). Congress provided the EEOC with the authority to ensure employers’ compliance with Title VII. 
See infra note 69 and accompanying text. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. establishes that when a court is reviewing an agency interpretation, the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute, if Congress 
has remained silent. 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). A court may not substitute its own interpretation if 
the agency’s is also reasonable. Id. at 844; see, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 107 
(2d Cir. 2018) (holding the plaintiff is entitled to bring a claim of sexual orientation discrimination 
under Title VII because sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination). 
 69 See Baldwin, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080, at 8, 13 (citing the Price Waterhouse decision 
to support the notion that each protected category must be treated equally under Title VII and the 
Oncale decision to support the notion that Congress does not have to foresee every application of the 
statute to have it apply). An individual who wishes to bring an employment discrimination claim in 
federal court must first file it with the EEOC. Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm/, [https://perma.cc/DHA4-
DKCV]. The EEOC has the authority to investigate discrimination charges and determine whether 
discrimination has occurred. Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/ [https://perma.cc/72MK-BS9H]. If the EEOC finds that a discrimination claim exists, 
it will try to settle the charge. Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPOR-
TUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm [https://perma.cc/6JAJ-
DCK7]. If unsuccessful, the EEOC may file a lawsuit. Id. Even if the EEOC does not find a cogniza-
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mark decision in Baldwin v. Foxx, which explicitly recognized that discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation is a Title VII violation.70 In Baldwin, the plain-
tiff filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint, alleging 
he had not been chosen for a permanent position with the Miami Tower TRA-
CON facility because he was gay.71 For the first time, the EEOC explicitly held 
that sexual orientation is, in fact, a sex-based consideration and therefore dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation is a violation of Title VII.72 
To reach its conclusion, the EEOC relied on the concept introduced by 
Price Waterhouse illustrating that Title VII protections apply equally to all 
classes of people covered by the statute.73 The EEOC, consequently, put forth 
the notion of associational discrimination—a concept previously reserved for 
racial discrimination—and applied it to sex discrimination.74 The EEOC stated 
that an individual cannot be discriminated against for associating with a mem-
ber of a certain gender, just as an individual cannot be discriminated against 
for associating with a member of a certain race.75 
Some courts have opted to follow the EEOC’s decision.76 These courts sim-
ilarly turn to Price Waterhouse and Oncale, as well as the changing societal 
landscape, for support.77 For example, in 2017 in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community 
College of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, recognizing that it was 
                                                                                                                      
ble claim, the individual may file a claim in federal court once the administrative remedy is exhausted. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2018). 
 70 Baldwin, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080, at 6; see Surette, supra note 37 (denoting Baldwin 
as a “landmark decision”). The EEOC’s website lists “sex” among the categories against which an 
employer may not discriminate. Overview, supra note 69. Furthermore, the EEOC explicitly includes 
“sexual orientation.” Id. 
 71 Baldwin, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080, at 2. Defendant-employer, claimed that because 
the full-time position was never filled, there was no cognizable discrimination claim. Id. Plaintiff, on 
the other hand, attributed it to the fact that he was gay, as evidenced by his supervisor ’s negative 
comments about his sexual orientation. Id. These comments included being told, “[w]e don’t need to 
hear about that gay stuff.” Id. 
 72 Id. at 6. The EEOC articulated why sexual orientation cannot be removed from a sex-based 
consideration by emphasizing that sexual orientation discrimination is premised on sex-based prefer-
ences (i.e. a man being attracted to a man or a woman being attracted to a woman). Id. 
 73 Id. at 8–9. 
 74 Id. at 8. Associational discrimination exists when a person is discriminated against for associat-
ing with a person of a certain group. Id. This notion first existed in the context of racial discrimina-
tion. See Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding an employer cannot base 
an employment action on an employee’s association with someone of a particular race). The rationale 
in the context of race was that this type of discrimination inherently implicates the employee’s race, 
which is a violation of Title VII. Baldwin, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080, at 8. The EEOC extend-
ed protections to sex discrimination because Price Waterhouse established that all categories of Title 
VII deserve equal treatment. Id. at 8–9. 
 75 Baldwin, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080 at 8–9. 
 76 See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 107 (highlighting that the EEOC now explicitly holds that sexual orien-
tation is a sex-based consideration) 
 77 Id.; Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (emphasizing the societal changes even beyond employment law 
that have moved to protect same-sex couples, including gay marriage). 
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straying away from precedent, ultimately concluded that it is “impossible to dis-
criminate on the basis of sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis 
sex.”78 The court supported its holding by drawing on precedence from the Su-
preme Court and the EEOC.79 Beyond that, the Hively court also emphasized the 
responsibility of the courts to correct the rule of law to ensure decisions align 
with present-day realities—in this case, the evolution of LGBTQ rights.80 
III. EEOC PRECEDENT: EQUALITY FOR ALL TITLE VII PROTECTED 
CLASSES AND THE LINK BETWEEN RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Equal opportunity in the workplace is at the heart of the EEOC’s mis-
sion.81 In 2015, the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin v. Foxx emphasized the notion 
of equality for all classes of people protected under Title VII.82 First, it empha-
sized that the protections regarding hiring, firing, compensation, and privileges 
equally apply to members of the LGBTQ community.83 Simply put, an em-
ployer is not allowed to consider sexual orientation when making an employ-
ment decision.84 
Second, the EEOC, like the Supreme Court in Oncale, notably looked to 
the parallel between race and sex discrimination by applying the concept of 
associational discrimination.85 Similar to the prohibition on discrimination 
against an employee who associates—through marriage, friendship, or some 
other relationship—with someone of a particular race, an employer cannot dis-
criminate because of an employee’s decision to associate with a member of a 
                                                                                                                      
 78 Hively, 853 F.3d at 351. The plaintiff in this case was openly lesbian and a part-time professor 
at Ivy Tech Community College. Id. at 341. After unsuccessfully applying for full-time employment 
on multiple occasions, she filed a Title VII claim alleging discrimination based on her sexual orienta-
tion. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that Hively presented a cognizable Title VII claim, breaking with 
prior precedent. Id. at 340–41. 
 79 Id. at 342, 350. 
 80 See id. at 350–51 (discussing the need to adapt law to present-day questions). To support its 
newfound position, the Seventh Circuit turned to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Price Waterhouse 
and Oncale, the EEOC’s guidance in Baldwin, and the “common-sense reality” that makes it impossi-
ble to separate sexual orientation discrimination from sex discrimination. Id. at 342, 344, 351. Like 
the EEOC, the Seventh Circuit also relied on the associational theory of race discrimination (making it 
a violation to discriminate against someone for associating with another of a certain race) to bolster its 
position. Id. at 347, 349. 
 81 Overview, supra note 69. 
 82 See Baldwin v. Fox, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080, at 8 (July 15, 2015) https://www.eeoc.
gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XRM-AMGP] (articulating that Price Waterhouse 
established that all categories protected by Title VII, including race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin, must be treated identically). 
 83 Id. at 5–6. The EEOC held that when sexual orientation is taken into account by an employer, 
the employee’s sex is also consequently considered. Id. Therefore, a Title VII violation existed. Id. 
 84 Id. at 6. 
 85 Id. at 8; see supra note 74. 
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certain sex.86 When the Supreme Court decided to broaden the understanding 
of racial discrimination to include this associational dimension, changing the 
language of the statute was not required.87 The EEOC, in drawing this analogy, 
suggested the same is true for sex-based associational discrimination.88 With 
equality at the center of Title VII, all classes protected by the statute are enti-
tled to the same level of protection.89 
As previously illustrated, the line of reasoning utilized by the EEOC in 
Baldwin is already influential, and the Supreme Court should ensure its status 
as binding precedent when it decides Bostock.90 First, in following the Su-
preme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., courts should give a considerable amount of deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute.91 Congress has delegated the authori-
ty to the EEOC to enforce Title VII.92 Because its interpretation is reasonable, 
the Supreme Court should defer to the EEOC’s understanding of “sex” and 
require other courts to do the same.93 
Secondly, courts have an obligation to interpret what statutes mean and 
how they should be applied.94 What a statute meant to legislators when it first 
                                                                                                                      
 86 Baldwin, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080, at 8. 
 87 See id. (highlighting the Supreme Court’s recognition of associational discrimination absent a 
change in the statute). The EEOC cites to Floyd v. Amite County School District, 581 F.3d 244, 249 
(5th Cir. 2009), and Holcomb as two cases where courts held that discriminating against a person who 
associates with a member of a particular race is a violation of Title VII. Baldwin, EEOC Decision No. 
01 20133080 at 8; see Floyd v. Amite Cty. Sch. Dist., 581 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
Title VII protects against discrimination resulting from a relationship with someone of a certain race); 
Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139 (holding that it is illegal for an employer to make an employment decision 
because of that employee’s association with a person of another race). 
 88 Baldwin, EEOC Decision No. 01 20133080 at 8–9. 
 89 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 349 (7th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing 
that because the statute does not make distinctions among classes of people, all who are protected 
under Title VII are entitled to the same level and breadth of protection).  
 90 See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that the Sev-
enth and Eleventh Circuits addressed the issue of whether sexual orientation discrimination is prohib-
ited by Title VII following the EEOC’s Baldwin decision); Hively, 853 F.3d at 344 (acknowledging 
the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin and similarly relying on associational discrimination logic to support 
a finding that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII).  
 91 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (hold-
ing that when a court is reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute on which Congress has not 
spoken, the question for the court is whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a “permissible 
construction of the statute”). The Supreme Court wrote that a court may not reinterpret a statute when 
an agency has already provided a reasonable interpretation of its meaning. Id. at 844. 
 92 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2018) (delegating power to the EEOC to ensure employers do not engage 
in discriminatory practices, including those falling within the scope of Title VII); see Overview, supra 
note 69 (providing an overview of the function of the EEOC in relation to Title VII claims). 
 93 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (noting that an agency interpretation is unreasonable if it is “arbi-
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”). 
 94 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (stating the court’s power to overrule prior decisions to reflect the 
Supreme Court’s contemporary position on a subject). The court stressed that its interpretation of 
2020] Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII II.-49 
went into effect may be relevant, but it is not the stopping point; it would have 
been impossible for the 1964 Senate to have contemplated every potential dis-
criminatory situation when enacting Title VII.95 Thus, the EEOC’s approach 
provides the most logical interpretation—it remains faithful to Congress’ intent 
to promote equality in the workplace and adapts to present-day questions.96 
Race discrimination underwent this natural evolution, resulting in a broadened 
scope with associational discrimination, so it is only logical that sex discrimi-
nation receives this same treatment.97 
CONCLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT’S TASK 
Title VII was enacted in 1964 to promote workplace equality for all clas-
ses of protected people. It is a statute aimed at eliminating discriminatory prac-
tices. Allowing sexual orientation discrimination to exist in the workplace runs 
counter to this purpose and the position previously paved by the Second and 
Seventh Circuits, the EEOC, and the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court 
already banned sex stereotyping, decriminalized homosexual behavior, out-
lawed same-sex sexual harassment, and legalized gay marriage. The next logi-
cal step for the Supreme Court to take is holding, once and for all, that sexual 
orientation is a sex-based consideration and Title VII prohibits any and all dis-
crimination on that basis. Ruling otherwise would permit continued discrimi-
nation in the workplace against LGBTQ individuals, who would be left with-
out any meaningful protection, particularly in states that have explicitly de-
clined to enact legislation to protect them. 
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“sex” under Title VII must be made against the backdrop of discriminatory employment practices, 
plus the realities of sexual orientation discrimination more generally. Id. at 350–51. 
95 Id. at 345 (“The Court could not have been clearer: the fact that the enacting Congress may not 
have anticipated a particular application of the law cannot stand in the way of the provisions of the 
law that are on the books.”). 
96 See McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (holding that the purpose of 
Title VII was to guarantee equal employment opportunities for the statute’s protected classes, includ-
ing race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (indicating that all 
Title VII protected classes should be treated equally in terms of level of protection). 
97 See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 131 (recognizing the evolution of the legal framework for evaluating 
claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII). In addition to pointing to Price Waterhouse, 
the Second Circuit in Zarda highlighted associational discrimination in the racial context as relevant 
to the evolution of Title VII as it relates to sex. Id. 
